In Venezuela, Maduro’s Biggest Test Yet

I followed Venezuela for a decade. I stopped not long after the 2017 protests were subdued. I mostly ignored the 2019 disputed presidency because dictatorship had been consolidated. I haven’t followed since before my last article in 2020, which argued Venezuela is a lost cause.

My ears have perked up at headlines like “In Venezuela, Is This Time Different?” and “Venezuela’s Strongman Could Actually Lose.” The journos in the know say it’s not a lost cause. They say stealing another election may be too tall an order for President Nicolas Maduro. Here’s the short story.

Venezuela has enjoyed economic growth and lower inflation, in part due to an easing of sanctions. Stealing an election would renew those sanctions and reverse the growth. Meanwhile, chavismo morale is at an all-time low.

Stealing an election that should go to the opposition by 10 to 20 points isn’t difficult in Venezuela, but current polls look more like a 30- to 40-point difference. Stealing this would be ridiculous even to chavismo’s apologists.

The rank-and-file chavistas don’t want to go backward economically, and they would be needed on the front line to repress protests. Some of them are young and can imagine political futures for themselves outside the dictatorship.

The argument that maybe this time is different hinges on the fact that maybe Maduro can’t do it this time, that history has caught up to him.

But the degree of difficulty doesn’t change the fact that Maduro has two options, both of which have nothing to do with how people vote:

• Accept defeat.
• Steal another one.

Again, most analysis is focused on the unviability of the second option. But how difficult is the first option?

Accepting defeat doesn’t mean a government handover; it means negotiated transition. It means amnesty. It means chavista leaders get to keep the money and live in exile with impunity. Otherwise there is no reason for them not to fight it out.

In Peru, dispelling Fujimori and his right-hand man was all it took. In Venezuela, there are too many players. There are probably a half dozen billionaires and a dozen nine-digit millionaires. It’s anybody’s guess how many eight-figure millionaires and single-digit millionaires there are. Nicolas and Cilia get to take the money and run, but what about all the others?

Sure, Maduro could abandon them. But I think it more likely that the number of them inspire Maduro to stick it out. The downside of stealing another election and repressing the people, difficult as it may be to pull off, is limited.

Where would all those chavista bosses go? If you need impunity for life, you don’t have good options in the Americas. Despite all the criticisms of Latin American democracies, most countries’ governments have changed ideological hands. Cuba and Nicaragua are the only true dictatorships, and Cuba is looking shaky.

How do you spend $1 billion in Cuba? Venezuela’s leaders have a good idea what kind of lifestyle the Cuban elites lead, and it’s probably not what they’re accustomed to. They could leave Latin America … for Russia or China? Fujimori, a citizen of Japan, couldn’t stay away from Latin America for even a decade.

You have to assume Maduro tries to steal another one, and the negotiated transition only materializes if the military refuses to repress the people again.

I wrote in 2017, “Why Does Nicolas Maduro Get No Respect?“, an essay challenging the conventional wisdom that he is inept, but rather a brilliant strategist and political operator. I would not underestimate him even in the face of this newest test.

Both Options End in Blood

If Maduro falls, what happens next? The government does not control Venezuela’s entire territory. If the wildcat miners and drug gangs which possess vast swaths of rural land are told the party is over, a house of cards falls and chaos breaks out. In the cities, scores are settled and fiefdoms are disputed.

I wrote in 2015 that all roads in Venezuela lead to a right-wing strongman. The question is when. I didn’t realize at the time that there would be a 21st-century prototype outside of Venezuela, in El Salvador, or that public safety would be the catalyst and not the need to undo a socialist dictatorship. But I still believe that’s what’s coming in Venezuela.

I wrote just last week that I’m newly committed to acknowledging that I have no idea what will happen. Maybe I’m wrong and a transitional government hits the ground running, ushering in sustained economic growth while ensuring public safety and political freedoms for everybody.

I just can’t imagine it, but nobody knows and stranger things have happened.